For Cavell, American transcendentalism and film share the capacity to provide an education in taking an interest in one's experience. The results of such interest are for him ultimately political, allowing for self-cultivation and hence for mutual progress; an aspiration both romantic and liberal. However, the meeting of an experiential focus with political hopes extends beyond Cavell, and the wider fact of this convergence allows us to conceive his project as part of a broader milieu. One way to think Cavell historically is to consider some of the contexts in which his voice was forged. Although he sometimes alludes to it, we don't readily associate Cavell with 1960s radicalism, the counterculture, or the New Left. His sensibility and concerns seem more abstract than this, and operate on other planes than activism or polemic. His voice also unmistakably belongs to both a disciplinary training in philosophy (specifically, a 1950s analytic context) and to an earlier generation. Yet granting the unmistakable significance of these, we can still observe that despite his originality, and his anomalousness as an analytic philosopher, Cavell is not an a-contextual voice in American letters. He is not alone in exploring the value of attention to (American) experience as a resource for improvement, a fact to which he himself draws notice. Further, he anticipates certain developments in our critical present centred around the possibilities for a tone of hope and optimism with more than personal implications.
him, its abolition being a prerequisite for any meaningful national conversation to begin.
Gould's comment about canons of inheritance is made in a review of Lawrence Rhu's Stanley Cavell 's American Dream: Shakespeare, Philosophy, and Hol- lywood Movies, in which Rhu argues that "Cavell is an American dreamer of a recognizable kind." When Gould writes of Rhu that his work confirms that "Cavell's America is more than a dream if still less than the eventual community we had hoped for," this interesting use of the past pluperfect ('had hoped') allows us to infer that the "we" who wished for eventual community refers specifically to the generation of intellectuals slightly younger than Cavell who came of age during the 1960s, raising the idea of a lost wish or possibility as a generational experience. 9 Another scholar, intellectual historian James Kloppenberg, poses a question about the struggle to find a productive register in the face of liberal disappointment that also seems relevant here. "Many of us who came of age in America during the war in Vietnam urged our elders to stop seeing the world through a World War II-induced reflexive pro-Americanism," Kloppenberg observes, going on to ask: "Can we now stop seeing our past through an equally distorting Vietnam-induced reflexive antiAmericanism? Can we acknowledge that indignation and cynicism too can obstruct critical understanding?" 10 Kloppenberg's most recent book is an exploration of Obama's debt to American philosophical pragmatism, though since its publication, some may argue the Obama administration has added some causes for liberal despair. What is at stake in his comments about cynicism is the struggle to find a register that is productive without being complicit, hopeful without being purblind, and restorative without being culpable. Cavell explicitly identified this issue and thematised it before others have, finding his own solution in the incorporation of Emerson's voice, characterised as an optimistic valence that is won back from, and has passed through, tragic knowledge, an alternative to either cynicism or obliviousness.
Cavell's own "audacity of hope" is in general less identified with immediate circumstance, being rather a transcendental open-ended hopefulness, allowing for 9. Gould, review, http://olponline.org/2010/08/19/tim-gould-reviews-lawrence-rhus-stanleycavells -american-dream-previously-unpublished/.
10. James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 19. the ongoing possibility of change and improvement. However, his explicit comments on being politically "liberal" in his memoirs occur in connection with Vietnam and the student protests of the 1960s, and with questions of race relations in America.
One of the few places in his work where he self-identifies specifically as "liberal" is in relation to a 1969 occupation at Harvard in protest against Vietnam: radicals and conservatives have reasons. Liberals like myself, with jerking knees and bleeding hearts, seem to have no reasons; merely, instead, to give interpretations. People will say that a time for talking comes to an end. Of course I would expect to have an interpretation of their saying so, since as long as there is time to say so there is time to listen and think. 11
The same year, Cavell and John Rawls intervened in another student protest, which resulted in their helping with the process of setting up the African American Studies programme at Harvard (Cornel West has even said that without Cavell, there would be no such department there, apparently in partial response to the question of whether Cavell has been conscious enough of matters of race in American cultural and political life). 12 Rawls was Cavell's longtime friend and colleague, and their work has been linked by critics and admirers alike. Cavell carefully distinguishes his work from Rawls' around issues of perfectionism's relation to democracy, but to some degree his own reception has been caught up in questions of whether he himself is or isn't a liberal thinker. Stephen Mulhall remarks that "Cavell's picture of aesthetics, morality, and politics is essentially liberal," but "this may be because […] aesthetic, moral, and political practice in the late twentieth century -are themselves inevitably and ineradicably liberal." 13 Arguably though, a specifically American sense of the "liberal" pervades Cavell's work at the level of contextual background in addition to this philosophical sense.
In Little Did I Know, Cavell acknowledges himself as liberal, as well as highlighting the ways in which the external world of 1960s political events made its way 11. Cavell, Little, 507. 12. Cavell and Paul Standish, "Stanley Cavell into the classroom. In addition, as I have argued elsewhere, it is likely that the liberalism of mid-century American intellectual culture was an important influence on his thinking (a differently qualified position than that of 1960s activism). But for Cavell, such political liberalism doesn't translate directly to his philosophy, owing both to the distinctive brief of philosophy, and to the work the transcendentalist register does in his project. Philosophy's task, as Cavell defines it, is responsiveness to the fact of interest. This is different to the task of political advocacy, though what such response reveals may enable it. As he explains in Little Did I Know, "Perhaps prehistory is my medium, to give an account of the conditions, call it the context, that have to happen before something happens." 14 For Cavell, polemic is something other than philosophy. 15 The case he makes for the need to identity philosophy's distinctive American locations accompanies a persistent distrust of speaking literally in a political register that has exposed him to censure, an issue not helped by the exceptionalist legacy of American romanticism. Nonetheless, the preparedness for mutual exposure expressed in speech (or writing) and response remain more primary for Cavell than specific political affiliation: "no amount of contribution is more valuable to the formation and preservation of community than the willingness to contribute and the occasion to be heard." 16 If, then, we pinpoint certain high liberal moments, such as the mid-to late 1960s, as important to his work, it would be misguided not to stress at the same time the enduring significance of the 1950s and early 1960s, the period in which forms of "ordinary language philosophy" emerged as a counterpoint to logical positivism, and in which Cavell was educated; he submitted his doctorate in 1961, having begun it ten years previously. As he outlines in the foreword to The Claim of Reason, this development not only enabled him to find a way to "go on" in disciplinary terms, it cast new light on moral problems. However remote ordinary language philosophy may seem from some of Cavell's other (and sometimes later) interests, we can't hold it apart from them, since it is integral to the ethos by which those interests are inter- the present era in Iraq," identifying a dynamic of recurring legitimation crises running from the Civil War, through Vietnam, to the George W. Bush administration. 21 These are moments, for him, of "deformation": that is, not only moments of political disagreement, but of casting into doubt the viability of a more extensive understanding of the "project" of America (and indeed, of the Enlightenment project, as these come together in his readings in Pursuits). As Shira Wolowsky has pointed out, in Cavell, as in Whitman, "the issue of skepticism appears not to be theoretically epistemological but […] concerned instead with questions of American culture, society and politics: that is, of civic decision and responsibility," in the context of a concern with the fragility of "joint national life." 22 Wolowsky is alluding to the strain of American writing in which the writer attempts to propose solutions to the problems of epistemology at the same time as those of society, where personal and political forms of skepticism, figured as loss and crisis, are intimately related.
For Cavell, Thoreau's Walden is a superlative instance of this approach, which he reads as "a book of losses" explored philosophically, losses linking a personal skeptical crisis and national failings. 23 While we might expect to find this link in regard to a transcendentalist text, such losses and linkages are also alluded to in
The World Viewed. Immediately following a passage about belief in the book is a passage in which historically located American anxieties sit very close to the skeptical drama as such. A subtle elision is at work, whereby the 'mind' in general, Cavell's own mind, and America's mind -expressed in the first person plural "we" -become identified:
We no longer grant, or take it for granted, that men doing the work of the world together are working for the world's good […] fixed fury we do ourselves no injury, in order not to see the injury we have done, and do. So the mind tears itself apart trying to pull free. 24 If during World War II America understood itself to be working for the world's good, by the time of writing Cavell is beset with guilt about American acts of violence. The way this passage breaks into propria persona, and the connection drawn between skepticism as such, and skepticism about America's moral and political status, echo the well-known passage in the "The Avoidance of Love," Cavell's essay on King Lear, composed in 1967, in he makes reference to Vietnam. Parts of "The Avoidance of Love" bear a striking resemblance to sociologist Robert Bellah's celebrated essay, "Civil Religion in America," also of 1967. There, Bellah refers to the moment of his writing as "the third time of trial" for the nation, the first two trials being the war of independence and the internal battle over slavery. Bewitched by its own power, America has for Bellah, in Vietnam, "stumbled into a military confrontation where we have come to feel that our honor is at stake." 25 Cavell shares a diagnosis with commentators such as Bellah, though it is tied in his own work to philosophical questions.
In "The Avoidance of Love," Cavell invokes America as the protagonist of its own tragedy, in its "insatiable" desire to be the object of love, and its skepticism about its own existence:
Since it had a birth, it may die. It feels mortal. And it wishes proof not merely of its continuance but of its existence, a fact it has never been able to take for granted. Therefore its need for love is insatiable […] Those who voice politically radical wishes for this country may forget the radical hopes it holds for itself, and not know that the hatred of America by its intellectuals is only their own version of patriotism. It is the need for love as proof of its existence which makes it so frighteningly destructive […] and which makes it incapable of seeing that it is destructive and frightening. It imagines its evils to come from out- In his response to this passage, Gould observes, "I doubt that one can separate Cavell's sense of his own genesis as a writer from his awareness of the war in Vietnam or of Nixon's efforts to stay in power at the expense of the American Constitution." The motif of individual perfectionist skeptical crisis -Cavell's sense of his trajectory to becoming a writer -is here explicitly situated in the context of a wider national crisis. As Gould puts it, "the sense of connection between his crisis and the nation's is all but ubiquitous." 27 It is the nature of this connection that places Cavell specifically in the American romantic tradition, though the national crisis of course suffused the work of his contemporaries, literary and otherwise.
In The Senses of Walden, Cavell writes "the time of crisis depicted in this book is not alone a private one, and not wholly cosmic. It is simultaneously a crisis in the nation's life. And the nation too must die down to the root if it is to continue to recognize and neighbour itself." The narrator of Walden expresses a "mood at once of absolute hope and yet of absolute defeat, his own and the nation's," since "the nation, and the nation's people, have yet to be well made." This crisis is one, according to Cavell, for which Walden proposes the remedy of writing of a certain kind: "It would be a fair summary of the book's motive to say that it invites us to take an interest in our lives, and teaches us how." 28 Through the writer's and the reader's mutual constitution of one another's voices in the process of reading and being read, the nation can be "reconstituted," a goal Cavell hasn't been shy of claiming for his own work, adding his own voice to the transcendentalist "chorus" as Thoreau's inheritor. 29 In this way, the nation's lack of identity with itself in his own times is linked Cavell speaks on several occasions of feeling generationally out of step, being too young during the Depression years to claim that era, missing his chance to join those who served in World War II, the so-called greatest generation (though only just, for reasons of health), and being somewhat older than the young radicals of the 1960s. Indeed, it is this very issue of "partial identification," he says, that informs his awareness that to say 'we' and speak on behalf of others is to make a "moral claim," not simply to reflect a state of affairs. 32 However, although his interest in the transcendentalists is the most extensive and well documented aspect of his engagement with American writing, Cavell's response to twentieth-century American writers is equally directed toward finding exemplars within the American scene who approach experience in same way he does. Hence while he famously reaches backwards to Emerson and Thoreau, he also makes examples of near contemporaries, including some who cast his own work in a slightly different light than it is perhaps usually consid- Reiterating his point about the value of both Goodman and the New Critics in Little Did I Know, Cavell comments, "I wanted philosophy to take on such criticism, perhaps be taken on by it, not, as was mostly the case, to avoid it." 37 Not only did the New Critics fail to engage with philosophy, philosophy failed to engage with them. This is where the preoccupations I have been tracing return us to film. Cavell suggests that the remedy for America's occlusion of philosophy might lie in film. America has generated a unique philosophy, Cavell argues, but lacks the tools with which to recognise it. Analytic philosophy shares in this failure of recognition. And so, Cavell ex- criticism, and of the role of experience in criticism, are worked out in Cavell's approach to film, his choice of "companions" in this enterprise becomes significant. As we've seen, unusually for a philosopher, Cavell expresses a debt to practitioners of criticism, both cultural and aesthetic. The object isn't criticised in isolation though.
The critic's life also comes into her criticism, partly because each film (or artwork) is seen at a specific time and place, as well as with other people. Like those cynical heroes who were idealists before they discovered that the world was more rotten than they had been led to expect, we're just about all of us displaced persons, "a long way from home." […] that home no longer exists.
But there are movie houses. In whatever city we find ourselves we can duck into a theater and see on the screen our familiars -our old "ideals" aging as we are and no longer looking so ideal. Where could we better stoke the fires of our masochism than at rotten movies in gaudy seedy picture palaces in cities that 44. Kael, "Trash, " 349. 45. Cavell, World Viewed, 29. 46 . Cavell, World Viewed, 11.
run together, movies and anonymity a common denominator. Movies -a tawdry corrupt art for a tawdry corrupt world -fit the way we feel. 47 National political contexts for disenchantment are no doubt important here, but the issue by 1969 is also one for Kael of overfamiliarity with cinematic conventions, and an arrival at irony; an aesthetic change, whereby the movies' embrace of trashiness seems apt.
I hope I have begun to illustrate earlier in this paper that Cavell draws together experiential and liberal themes with American romanticism, a confluence that can to an extent be seen as shared in and informed by a context. But I would also like to highlight that his emplacement within that context remains highly particular. His mixing of romantic hope and liberal disappointment, alongside his debts to existentialism and phenomenological philosophy, seem to locate him in time, alongside the youth of the 1960s. Cavell's aesthetic preferences, though, are a point of dissimilarity with the counterculture, especially as these were to be expressed by the time of the 1970s "New Hollywood" cinema Kael championed. Further, although he shares ground with this milieu, Cavell's sensibility, as I've mentioned, is importantly shaped by the aesthetic and intellectual mores of the preceding decades. Cavell's affinities with the American intellectual and artistic culture of the 1960s, though I would suggest that these do exist, thus occur at a particular angle of inflection.
By way of concluding, I would like to return to the thematics of hope and despair. While there are other reasons Cavell doesn't find Kael an entirely companion spirit in her response to film, one facet of their divergence is tonal. Owing to its Emersonian inflections, the development of Cavell's work on Hollywood cinema over the course of his career has moved towards its consideration in terms of potential for an improved sociality (he explains that the idea of remarriage comedy, with its onus on the "second chance," coalesced for him around 1974). The mood of New Hollywood cinema and neo-noir is rather one of disillusion and even dissolution, where community seems distinctly frangible. We have arrived in our current critical moment at a further turn of the wheel than that of Kael's era, where for some, a disenchanted mood, and the aesthetics of irony in general, no longer seem productive. In the search 47. Kael, "Trash, Art and the Movies," 337.
for alternative kinds of tone, as this impetus is manifested for example in my own field, literary studies, both Emersonian ethics and a Thoreauvian model of attention have increasingly become a focus. This return to the transcendentalists (often directly via Cavell), and a renewed emphasis on experience now, may bring a submerged historical context in its wake.
